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ARMS INSPECTION AND THE CONSTITUTION*
By Louis -_ENXMt

Inttroduction
Disarmament--or, more accurately, the control of armaments-appears
daily in the official statements of governments, in United Nations debates,
in newspaper headlines. Yet few students of affairs between nations today
view the prospects for substantial control of armaments with confidence,
whatever their hopes. All would have to agree that in the policies of governments, not least of the United States Government, the efforts to achieve
disarmament are, and are likely long to remain, a footnote to a policy of
deterrence through strength.
The prospects for achieving any control of armaments, like the reasons
for total failure to date, are tangled in the confusions and mysteries of
armament and disarmament and their place in the foreign and defense
policies of governments. But both past failure and future hopes may be
concentrated in the congeries of problems denoted "inspection." Nationsthe United States and the Soviet Union, in particular-have not reached
agreement on ways which will satisfy each other that they are living up to
the limitations on arms or armies which will have been adopted.
Inspection was not a serious problem in earlier efforts to disarm. Before
the First World War, and even later, the "politesse" of relations between
nations seemed to require at least the pretence that they, like gentlemen,
could of course be trusted to keep theii agreements. Perhaps there were
other reasons; perhaps animosities and fears between principal nations
were less acute; perhaps wars were still an extension of international politics, not an unspeakable threat of world destruction; perhaps an illegal
* This article draws principally on one chapter in a study executed by the author for the
Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, made possible by a grant from
the Institute for International Order. The study has been published by Columbia University
Press as Arms Control and Inspection in American Law, with a Foreword by Professor Philip C.
Jessup. The author and the Journalare grateful to the Legislative Drafting Research Fund and
to Columbia University Press for permission to draw on the study as a basis for this article.
The extensive notes and citation of authorities have been omitted. There is also no attempt
to deal with other aspects constituting the bulk of the project. The full scope of the study may
be seen from its table of contents: I. Introduction; II. Arms Control Provisions; III. Arms
Control and the Constitution; IV. Investigation of Compliance with Arms Control; V. Congressional Implementation of Arms Control; VI. State Laws and Local Cooperation; VII.
International Administrative Regulation; VIII. International Tribunals; IX. Conclusion.
A condensed version of this article appeared earlier. Reprinted with permission from the
May 1959 issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1100 E. 58th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.
t B.A. 1937, Yeshiva Univ.; LL.B. 1940, Harvard Law School. Associate Director, Columbia
University Legislative Drafting Research Fund 1956. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Admitted to practice New York and before the Supreme Court.
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battleship or weapon was less terrifying, or more difficult to keep secret. Or,
perhaps nations were naive, trusting.
Since the Second World War all that has changed. Today we have new,
awesome weapons, new methods of concealment; and a distrust of the Soviet Union in a degree also new in contemporary international relations, at
least in its avowedness. The United States, if not others, will not agree to
disarm unless it can be satisfied that violations by the Soviet Union will be
quickly detected. No inspection, no disarmament. In fact, inspection has
become immediately independent of and more significant an issue than
disarmament. Recent efforts have been directed to inspection without disarmament, or with very little. Agreement, for example, to stop nuclear tests,
with inspection to insure compliance, may be desirable but will not itself
disarm anyone. The Eisenhower plan in 1955 for exchange of military blue
prints and for aerial inspection; the proposal this year for international
inspection in the Arctic; consideration of methods to afford warning against
surprise attacks-these involve no direct limitations on arms; they contemplate inspection, but only to give each nation some knowledge as to
what the other was doing with its armies and its arms.
That inspection is a crucial issue has long been recognized. Lately it has
also begun to receive some of the attention it requires. There has been debate as to whether effective inspection is possible and feasible. And there has
been discussion as to what it is one needs to know and what are the best
methods to obtain such knowledge. Recently there was published a study
of the technological problems of inspection executed at Columbia University with the participation of experts from other institutions.'
So far as appears, however, no one has hitherto paid much attention to
a very different order of considerations; what would inspection mean in the
United States? What are its implications for the way Americans live under
their Constitution and laws? This is, of course, a question for lawyers.
Legal, and particularly constitutional, difficulties suggest possible inroads
into our ways, habits, and institutions. The citizen will wish to know
whether, and how, arms control and inspection will impinge on his freedoms,
his rights, his privacies. The makers of United States policy, and our negotiators of international agreements, should wish to know what are the constitutional limitations on their authority to agree to controls and inspection,
limitations which may imply also obstacles to getting such agreements
accepted by the American people. And if constitutional considerations are
relevant to the kind of control agreement, to the kinds of inspection provisions, which the United States can accept, they are relevant also to what
the United States can ask of other nations. On the other hand, some elements in an arms control plan, particularly those relating to inspection, may
1
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be exaggerated and distorted, and painted, with little warrant, as threatening deep and novel intrusions into American law and American rights. It
is important to quiet undue concerns, as well as to alert attention to those
which are due.
The Problems
In this article we consider the constitutional problems suggested by
inspection in support of an arms control agreement.2 Two considerations
which relate to arms control and inspection have special importance for an
examination of their constitutional implications. The first of these is that
any system of arms control and inspection is primarily and fundamentally a
system of regulation not of private citizens or industries but of the United
States Government itself.
This would be something new for the United States. The United States
has laws, precedents and experience for regulating occupations, businesses
and other activities in the United States, such as liquor, firearms, narcotics.
In some of these, for example narcotics, the United States regulation supports and implements international agreements for cooperative control. In
these cases the United States Government desires to maintain control over
certain operations by private persons and corporations; there is, so to say,
an adversary relation between the government and persons involved in these
activities, and United States officials may be generally counted upon to
enforce these laws.
The control of armaments by international agreement differs fundamentally. It is principally a regulation of the Government of the United
States. Its purpose is to afford other nations "control" vis-h-vis the United
States Government, its civil and military authorities; to prevent collusion
-and to assure suspicious, hostile foreign governments that there is no
collusion-between the United States Government and industry and private
persons to circumvent controls which the government does not truly wish
to observe. That is what the United States would seek to assure in other
countries; that is what others will seek to control here.
And this leads us to the second fact of international life, inherent in any
system applied to sovereign and equal nations and particularly important in
time of cold war. This is the element of reciprocity, already intimated.
Whether an arms control scheme is universal and complete, or-like the
Eisenhower air inspection proposal of 1955 and the current efforts to stop
testing new weapons-merely preliminary and mainly bilateral, it is clear
that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. at least must be parties to it.
Inevitably therefore, the control plan will have to operate equally in the
2 Constitutional questions suggested by the control plan as a whole, by the prohibitions and
limitations which it might contain, are not examined here. See Aios CoNTRoL Am INSpEcTioN
iN AmERcAN LAw
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United States and in the Soviet Union. This lies at the heart of all aspects
of the disarmament problem, including a study of legal implications of
inspection. A system of inspection should be as minimal as is consistent with
assurance that violations would be detected. Obviously, fewer limitations
on the United States and less inspection and intrusion by foreign officials
within the United States would make a control scheme less onerous to the
United States, and more acceptable to Americari authorities, to the Congress
and the people; and it would create fewer constitutional and legal problems.
But these same American authorities, Congress and people, will wish maximum control and non-Russian inspection in the U.S.S.R., and inevitably, if
there is to be agreement, would have to accept reciprocal limitations and
inspection in the United States.
In the United States, to return to an example cited, there are established
patterns for inspection by federal officers under old and accepted systems
of congressional regulation of various industries. It would be simplest from
the point of view of the law and the Constitution, as well as for acceptability
by Congress and the public, to follow these established patterns and leave
implementation of an arms control treaty, so far as private activties are concerned, to American officials and American inspectors. The American government would then be responsible to an international or foreign supervisory
body for carrying out inspection and enforcement in the United States in
regard to citizens and corporations. The international inspectors can be
present to observe and satisfy themselves that the agreement is being kept
and that United States officials are neither colluding in nor condoning violations. The Russians, however, may not be content with such indirect inspection and control of American activities. More important, the American
people would have doubts about a system of inspection and control in the
Soviet Union under which Soviet officials might have substantial opportunity to deceive international supervisors. As a result there may be pressure
on the United States to agree, reciprocally, to direct inspection by international or foreign officials, even as to the activities of private persons and
establishments.
Similarly, for another example, we may believe that foreign inspectors
in the United States should in given circumstances require a search warrant;
such a warrant, we may believe, could be obtained from a United States
court without fear that such a court would refuse to cooperate and would
seek to frustrate the inspectors in their legitimate search. The Russians on
the other hand may have no such confidence in our courts. Again, we would
probably have no such confidence in the Soviet courts and may therefore
insist that inspection in Russia must be without warrant. But that could
hardly be obtained without agreement, reciprocally, to search without warrant in the United States.
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The negotiating dilemma created by the inevitable reciprocity will, of
course, face the Soviet Union as well as the United States. In general, it may
be assumed, any agreement reached will represent a compromise between
how much control, and how many rights and powers, we wish for international or foreign inspectors in Russia, how few we would like to give to
such inspectors in the United States. And the exact "terms" of this compromise will determine how serious are the constitutional problems which
it will raise in the United States.
Since no particular control agreement exists, or can be anticipated, one
cannot anticipate either what prohibited activities the "inspection" is
designed to uncover or what forms of inspection are likely to be provided.
For "inspection" is not a single concept denoting a single kind of activity.
Those who have negotiated about disarmament in and around the United
Nations have spoken of "verification" to cover all methods known, or to be
developed, to check whether a nation is violating its agreement to observe
whatever controls on armaments are adopted. What we generally think of
.as inspection-entering into depots or factories to see what is going on-is
but one method of "verification." The Columbia Inspection Study concluded that "workable systems of inspection can be designed to ensure
compliance with international disarmament agreements." What are some
forms of "verification," what are some of the likely components of "systems
of inspection?" And what are their implications for our laws and institutions? Here we can only suggest what are the principal constitutional questions, and what the probable answers.
Vetification
The search for effective and practical methods of verification has evoked
ingenious and perhaps silly suggestions for determining whether a country
is violating an arms control agreement and preparing for war. Thus, it has
been suggested that the President of the United States (and the chiefs of
other states) submit periodically to a lie detector test, or be given "truth
serum," and be required to answer questions about the extent of national
armaments and the nature of national war plans. Whatever may be said of
the desirability, effectiveness, and practicability of such a suggestion it
would not run afoul of any provision of the Constitution if the President by
treaty agreed to do so. If the President, or a successor President, refused to
submit to such tests, although required by treaty, he could not, of course,
be compelled to do so. The President himself is probably immune to the
process of the courts. He is, however, subject to impeachment for a "high
crime" or "misdemeanor" under article II, section 4, of the Constitution.
Other suggestions-for example, an elaborate system for encouraging
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informers, paying them large, tax-free fees for information of violations by
fellow citizens or government officials-would also raise more questions as
to desirability and practicability than of constitutional validity. There are
substantial precedents for awards to informers-for example, to those who
give information about illegal introduction into the United States of nuclear
materials, or about customs and tax evasions.
Leaving aside such indirect aids to knowledge of varying ingenuity and
practicability, we get to less singular ways of getting information as to
possible violations. An obvious way to get information is, of course, to ask
for it. Some measure of verification may be obtained by having governments themselves report on their compliance. The reports may be required
to provide details and specifications; for example, how many men are under
arms, where they are stationed, the size of the defense budget and its breakdown, details on industrial activity-including the production or use of
rare metals, precision instruments, and strategic items-the activities of
key scientific personnel, the existence of hospital cases of radiation injuries
indicating illegal activity.
To the extent that a nation's word can be trusted, these reports will
indicate whether the nation is complying. If the proper questions are asked,
indeed the answers themselves may reveal to experts whether they are
truthful; they may disclose other information as well, far more than the
reporting country may mean to divulge. Such reports, together with statistical information which nations prepare for their own use and which cannot be easily falsified, may give examining experts at the headquarters of
an international body strong evidence as to whether a nation is or is not
complying with the limitations of the agreement.
So long as we speak only of reports by governments, such submissions,
and the requirement in a treaty that they be submitted, present no serious
constitutional problems for the United States. Nothing in the Constitution
requires secrecy on any aspect of governmental activity; nothing in the
Constitution prevents the Executive from collecting and collating data of
the kind in question and making it public or reporting it to anyone. Such
reporting may be inconsistent with requirements of secrecy in existing laws;
these laws, however, can be repealed and would be willingly repealed, we
assume, by provisions in the arms control treaty or any implementing legislation which Congress will adopt.
Neither are there major difficulties when, in order for the United States
to make the necessary reports to an international or foreign body, the Government of the United States requires reports in turn from its own citizens.
The right to require returns and reports from those participating in industries regulated by the federal government has, in general, been upheld in the
face of challenge that such requirements constitute deprivations of liberty
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or property without due process of law; or that they violate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; or that they infringe "the right
of the people to be secure in their... papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." There would seem, therefore, no difficulty
in having the United States require reports and returns from persons engaged in activities related to the production of armaments which Congress
regulates in implementation of a disarmament treaty. The obligations of the
United States under such a treaty confer upon Congress the duty as well as
the power to pass necessary legislation to implement it. Such implementation may validly require from owners of uranium mines, for example, reports on the production of their mines; from owners of steel mills information on their production, their customers, and the amounts sold to them;
from manufacturers of designated armaments reports on the amounts of
arms produced and on their disposition. Probably, the United States could
require scientists to disclose any research relevant to an arms control agreement, and doctors and hospitals to report any cases which might indicate
radiation or other consequences of unlawful contact with regulated materials. And the United States Government can transmit such information
required from its citizens to an international body.
Voluntary reports by governments do not by themselves, however,
afford an adequate check on their compliance with disarmament controls.
Fortunately, the scientific and technological advances which have engendered new weapons, and new methods for concealing them, have also produced some methods for detecting what others would hide. Radar, seismic
or acoustic instruments, other developed or to-be-developed devices, can,
we are told, detect the flying of planes, the explosion of bombs, and other
activities or conditions which might violate an arms control agreement.
And fortunately, these, too, raise no serious constitutional difficulties.
Whether such monitoring stations and devices are established within or
without the United States, the United States can agree that they should be
operated, without being troubled constitutionally. Aerial inspection, toowhich has figured prominently in all United States inspection proposals,
including the Eisenhower plan in 1955 for exchanging military blueprints
with the Russians-raise no important concerns for constitutional rights.
There is nothing in the Constitution, we have said, which would bar the
United States from agreeing to give, and actually giving, to a foreign power
information, including maps, sketches and statistics, about its arms and
armies. And there is no constitutional obstacle to agreement on the part of
the United States that Soviet (or international) planes may fly over American territory and take photographs of anything. Such an agreement is within
the power of the treaty-makers. It does not violate any rights reserved to
the States or any liberties of the citizens.
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Violation Detection
Unfortunately, neither mechanical devices known to date, nor aerial
photographs, can detect all possible violations of the probable prohibitions
or limitations in a control agreement. And even where a photograph or a
mechanical device provides a record which gives a basis for suspicion that
there has been a violation, it will usually be necessary to follow-up this
suspicion with direct ground inspection in a suspected area, and perhaps
with interrogation of suspected and other individuals.
For constitutional examination, one may set apart first, inquiry and
investigation into activities of the United States Government and its officials. These may well be the particular concern of international inspection.
But, because it is the Government that is affected, not any private citizen,
the Constitution throws up no obstacles. If governments should some day
arrive at such agreement as we are assuming, the right of international
inspectors to come to government offices and inspect documents which now
are generally classified, to enter military and other federal establishments
and examine equipment and papers, will raise numerous practical difficulties. Indeed, it may be difficult to imagine the climate in which such practices would be acceptable; it would in fact require major adjustments to
shed habits and attitudes based on the need for secrecy. So far as the law
is concerned, however, direct inspection of this sort would create no problem which could not be disposed of by legislation and executive order. We
repeat: nothing in the Constitution requires the United States to maintain
secrecy against anybody, including foreign governments and international
bodies. The constitutional separateness and independence of the President
permits him to maintain the privacy of the Executive Branch vis-h-vis
Congress, but the Constitution does not require the secrecy of executive
departments if the President agrees to "bargain it away" by treaty. The
privacy of congressional premises and documents can also be abolished
if Congress agrees. Secrecy concerning governmental installations whose
inspection will be necessary and significant - the depots and arsenals,
atomic energy plants, perhaps power and related facilities like those of the
Tennessee Valley Authority and other authorities-would raise even fewer
political difficulties and no legal ones. The Constitution does not stand in
the way.
Similarly, the United States can require federal officials or former
officials to testify about their official activities, or to produce official documents. International inspectors then can probably be authorized by treaty
to interrogate civilian or military officials of the United States, or to require
them to produce official documents. But, the officer would still have his
privilege against self-incrimination, both as to testimony sought and to
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private papers; we shall discuss below the effect and significance of this
privilege.
It is the inspection of private establishments and installations, the
interrogation of private persons, that raises the significant constitutional
issues. Effective international scrutiny of arms control compliance must
take into account also activities in installations and establishments not
belonging to the government, of individuals who are private citizens rather
than government officials. While, as we have suggested, strictly private
violations would be unlikely and would be less significant, it would be important to assure that private persons and corporations were not acting in
collusion with the government to circumvent the control agreement. And
private persons might have information of violations by government officials
which international inspectors should be able to obtain. Direct investigation of private activities, then, is a key feature of arms inspection.
A preliminary and special situation is created by the fact that the
inspectors, we assume, would be foreign personnel, probably serving an
international body. Some problems, we have suggested, could be eliminated
if the direct policing, the inspections, and the interrogations, could be left
to United States officials. International or foreign officials might learn
enough to satisfy themselves from general forms of investigation not involving the exercise of authority over private places and persons. Or they
might be present to observe while national officials inspect or interrogatea plan of cooperative inspection like that contemplated for the EURATOM
power program to assure the United States that the nuclear materials it
supplies are not being diverted to military use. Documents, records, books,
and papers might be obtained for international officials by officers of the
United States, through established procedures. If the international officials
were not content with the action of national officials, and their complaints
went unheeded, they might assume that something was being hidden and
act accordingly.
The use of established national channels would avoid problems, political
as well as legal, in the United States; as we said, however, it might not be
feasible internationally. Negotiations have been in terms of direct inspection and interrogation by foreign officials or by representatives of an international body. This is what the United States apparently contemplates for
assuring Soviet compliance; it is what the United States, then, would have
to accept in turn.
In general, we conclude, that the functions which are anticipated in this
discussion may, 'consistent with the Constitution, be performed in the
United States by foreign personnel who are not in fact United States officials, not paid or controlled by the Executive Branch pursuant to Congressional authority, not under oath to support the Constitution of the United
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States. While some issues of proper "delegation" of power are suggested,
they do not appear to be constitutionally serious in regard to functions of
interrogation and inspection. And there are some, if limited, precedents in
other contexts in which Congress authorized international or foreign personnel-for example, international commissions, allied military forces conducting courts martial of their troops-to compel the attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths, to subpoena documents, either on their own
authority or by appeal to United States courts. There is also precedent in
past legislation for enforcing such subpoena power for international or
foreign bodies through the United States courts, who may hold in contempt
those who fail to heed the subpoenas, or convict for perjury those who give
false witnesses. As to inspection also, while there appears to be no precedent
for foreign inspectors, there is some precedent in systems of federal regulation for inspection by persons in the United States who are not strictly
federal officials.
Interrogation of Private Persons
The international inspectorate might wish to interrogate not only officials of government, but also persons in key industries, or other possible
witnesses. Mill owners and scientists, doctors and mine foremen might all
have information concerning arms or armament materials, or activities related to arms, in which the inspectors might have proper interest under the
control agreement. The authority of the United States to require private
persons to give testimony in an appropriate inquiry is not subject to doubt.
And, we conclude, Congress, pursuant to treaty, could provide that the
inspecting body, even if international in character, may issue or obtain suppoenas for testimony and documents, administer oaths, and require American citizens and residents to testify or produce papers before it.
Here, again, we run into the privilege against self-incrimination. It
would apply, we believe, to interrogations by international inspectors; and
it is a privilege available, the Supreme Court has said, even to the innocent
who may wish to avoid possible prosecution for a crime. This privilege, as
to some private persons and particularly as to government officials, may be
a serious obstacle to the work of international interrogation. The obstacle
can, however, be removed by an "immunity statute." Congress can compel
the incriminating testimony if it gives the witness immunity from prosecution for the crime revealed. In the case of arms control, the inspectors will
not be seriously interested in having the witness convicted of crime. What
they seek is information on behalf of other nations and the international
community; this they can get if the testimony is compelled pursuant to an
immunity statute.
It need hardly be said that international inspectors could not use physi-

Feb., 19601

ARMS INSPECTION

cal force to coerce testimony. A recalcitrant witness could be held in contempt and imprisoned. But no one, under the Constitution, could physically
compel him to talk. The inspectors and the rest of the world might deduce
what they wished from his continued silence, or try to find out from other
sources what he is hiding.
Physical Investigation
The heart of the inspection issue is raised by the problems of direct
inspection, i.e., physical entry by inspectors into private installations in
search of evidence of violations. Government installations apart, the important objects of international inspection would be the factories, the depots,
the laboratories in private hands. Some of these may be subject to inspection
because they are openly carrying on activities which are regulated or limited by the arms control agreement. There may be others clandestinely
doing what they are not supposed to be doing at all. If the control agreement
has merely imposed "ceilings," inspectors might wish to inspect factories
and depots where arms and other materials are admittedly manufactured or
stored to assure that the ceilings are not being exceeded. If to avoid such
"ceilings" and other regulations a private concern does clandestinely what
it could do openly only within limits; or if there are absolute prohibitions on
activities or on the possession of materials, the inspectors may wish to investigate any installation or other place where they suspect a violation.
A major part of our problem may be separated and examined, and conclusions reached with confidence based on an abundance of precedent. In so
far as the control plan imposes limitation and regulation, rather than complete prohibition, on private activity, it would mean that by treaty and
legislation the United States has regulated the manufacture of armaments
and related activities in the same manner as, under other powers, Congress
has regulated the transportation of firearms, the manufacture and handling
of narcotics, alcohol and food and drug products, the development of atomic
energy. On the basis of the precedents from such Congressional regulation,
some of which have passed the courts, all of which have the sanction of
long-standing usage, we may conclude that there would be little difficulty
in providing for inspection of the arms industry subjected to regulation by
treaty. As far as the Constitution is concerned, the United States could
agree, and Congress could require, that reports be made and books be kept
by those engaged in arms and related industries; that these reports be made
available for international inspection at all times; that international inspectors be permitted to come at any time, without warrant, to any industrial
establishment within the framework of the arms control regulation scheme,
including mines, factories, and depots, to inspect such reports and records,
as well as to check operations and inventory. The inspectors might make
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spot-checks, or inspectors might be stationed permanently in a factory or
other installation. Congress could make it a crime punishable in the courts
of the United States to falsify the records or reports to be kept, or to interfere with inspection. And the inspectors could be authorized to use force
to carry out inspection were it resisted.
The "regulated" arms industry, then, raises no special difficulty. The
troublesome issues are those of the "button factory." In the course of disarmament negotiations in the United Nations, the Soviet representative
once asked rhetorically whether the contemplated inspectors should have
the right to enter and inspect a button factory. The reply to this question
was, of course, that they should be able to enter a factory representing itself
as a button factory to make certain that it was. Here we have no avowed
armaments enterprises and related businesses subject to limitation or regulation by treaty, which, we have seen, may be carefully circumscribed and
scrutinized. Where an activity is prohibited, there is of course no permitted
industry to regulate; there is no registration of such activities with the
authorities; there is no consent to inspection which might be implied from
such registration. And even activities which are permitted within limits or
under supervision may be carried on clandestinely instead to avoid such
regulation. To the extent, then, that activities are prohibited, rather than
merely regulated-and even under regulation as regards those not registered and accepting regulation-all industrial installations are "button factories." Can there be inspection of factories ostensibly doing a permitted
thing to assure that they are not doing something prohibited?
The issues are difficult. We may seek possible analogies, as, for example,
municipal health and fire inspectors, but the constitutionality of these inspections without warrant has also not been settled.3 And arms inspectors
might be deemed to be more like police officials than like these municipal
inspectors. Analogy and precedent apart, one can suggest arguments based
on the broad powers of Congress or the treaty-makers, under which farreaching regulation and inspection may be permissible. We may recall that
during the Second World War, Congress did in effect turn virtually all
commercial enterprise into "regulated industry"; under the Emergency
Price Control Act, the ordinary business entries of every small businessman
became "required records" subject to inspection. If that could be done to
implement price control legislated in the national defense, could not commercial activity be subjected to inspection pursuant to arms control agreed
3 Since this article was prepared the Supreme Court of the United States decided Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). In that case the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, and fine
of $20.00, of a home owner who refused permission to a health inspector to inspect his basement
for sources of rat infestation. That case of course, involved a limited invocation of state power
rather than an exercise of federal authority.
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to in the national defense? Indeed, price regulation and inspection were
continuous, burdensome, intrusive into every establishment; by comparison, the possibility of arms inspection for any factory would be minimal.
These and other agreements can be made. But they are arguments, not
answers. Still, one should add that the "reasonableness" of such inspection
would surely be enhanced by limitations and qualifications upon it: for
example, if such inspection were permitted only in certain defined installations, perhaps based on size, or location, so that the possibility of their
being a "cover" is not absurd; if it were feasible to require some warning;
perhaps if United States or local officials were also present. And the entire
arrangement would seem still more "reasonable" if congressional implementation of arms control included provisions to protect or compensate
American industry for damage due to abuse of the inspection.
The Dwelling
What about the dwelling house? One has occasionally heard that to
assure that no violations of arms control are going on, international inspectors must be able to go anywhere at any time to look at any thing. As a
suggestion that governments' should not be able to cut off areas from
scrutiny, the proposal of course has sense. In its broadest form, however, it
would seem to imply also the right of inspectors to descend upon any private
dwelling in the land at any time of day or night without a warrant and
rummage for evidence of possible arms control violations. If this is what
the suggestion means, it makes little sense. Serious violations in a day of
hydrogen bombs and intercontinental missiles will hardly be taking place
in private dwellings. If some forms of biological and chemical warfare
might be prepared or secreted in small areas, perhaps even a private house,
their detection could hardly be effected simply by giving a blanket right to
inspect all dwellings without a warrant. If there were a basis for suspicion,
a warrant could be obtained, directly by international officials, or through
national officers, and refusal of national officers to cooperate would no doubt
be some indication that something was being hidden.
It may be that large estates could lodge industrial or military operations,
and a government eager to conceal something might concentrate it in some
such location. But this suggests a small and special situation, for whichif requiring a warrant is not feasible-special remedies might be necessary.
It hardly requires that all private dwellings in the land be rendered open to
inspection without warrant.
Since the suggestion has been deemed implied in proposals actually
under consideration, we should mention the constitutional difficulties which
such arrangements would entail. For the most part, they are those discussed
in relation to the "button factory." In regard to a dwelling house, the arms
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inspector looks even more like the police inspector trying to enforce a
criminal law than like the health inspector seeking immediately to protect
the health and welfare of the occupant and his neighbors. The arms inspector then would generally need a warrant based on "probable cause" as required by the fourth amendment. To justify his inspection without such
warrant would require a finding that his search, in all the circumstances,
would not be "unreasonable." The argument for such a finding may seek
some support in a broad treaty power; in the necessities of national defense
as reflected in an arms control agreement; in the need to agree in principle
to the inspection of an occasional dwelling in order to make it possible for
similar inspection in other countries, thereby to achieve greater security
for the United States; in the inability to rely on warrants from national
courts; in the extreme unlikelihood that a particular dwelling, or any dwelling, would in fact be inspected; and in the fact that it is only an extraordinary power in a special group for a very limited purpose most unlikely to
materialize, not a general warrant in the hands of police.
The arguments are difficult to weigh. If no feasible way were found for
meeting the special problem of the large estate, the "dwelling" here or in
other countries might appear to be a loophole of significance weakening
security against violation. A constitutional amendment, then, might be
necessary here to circumvent the problem. Certainly the American people
should have explained to them the implications of such a proposal, and an
opportunity given to them to indicate their willingness to make the sacrifice
involved.
Something should be said also of private structures other than dwellings
or business establishments, and of private lands, in which inspection might
be desired. Inspection in such places might be particularly pertinent if, for
example, agreement were reached in the current efforts to halt nuclear tests.
Suppose that after an agreement making nuclear tests illegal, a seismic
device at a monitoring station records a suspicious tremor leading international inspectors to suspect that there may have been an illegal nuclear
explosion within, say, a radius of 20 miles of Phoenix, Arizona. Inspectors
then, may wish to comb the area, including fields belonging to private persons, and perhaps barns, or other structures on these lands.
Again, the problem would disappear if it were feasible to get a warrant
for such inspection. But, in addition to political and practical objectives to
requiring a warrant, it is questionable whether the seismic warning would,
of itself, satisfy the constitutional requirement of "probable cause" to support a warrant for search of every private place within a large area. (Surely
it is open to serious doubt that these facts would support a warrant to search
every private house in the area.) Without a warrant, inspection of fields
presents no problem since, it has been held, the open field enjoys no con-
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stitutional protection against search and seizure. The barn, on the other
hand, while far below the dwelling in constitutional concern may rank
somewhere by the button factory and be subject to the considerations we
have discussed. Again, some safeguards, warnings, the presence of the
owner, of United States officials, perhaps some kind of warrant even if it
does not meet constitutional standards, might help to mitigate any "unreasonableness' in the search for purposes of the fourth amendment.
A control agreement might also provide for the inspection of private
hospitals, of private or institutional laboratories. These raise fewer difficulties than the dwelling house; the validity of such provisions can be
asserted, though with hesitation in differing degrees.
Other Considerations
These are major forms of "verification" which have been suggested.
There are others, generally of an auxiliary character, which may evoke
constitutional objection. Can international inspectors be permitted to tap
wires in aid of inspection or interrogation? Today the answer is not difficult:
wire tapping is a "dirty business," but it is not, the Supreme Court has held,
"search or seizure" under the fourth amendment, and there is no reason, in
general, why it cannot be permitted by treaty or act of Congress.
There may also be a proposal to require the registration of scientists;
all persons with a given level of scientific training or achievement would
be required to report their whereabouts and their "whatabouts" at regular
intervals. Here we are without clear precedent or authority. Some areas of
the problem may be carved out for answer with greater certainty. The
United States, for example, could agree to report on the activities of all the
scientists which it employs. Similarly, industries otherwise subject to regulation by Congress could probably be required to report on personnel engaged by them in research. By analogy to elements already in the Atomic
Energy Law, the United States might also require all persons who make
scientific discoveries related to arms or arms control to report and make
them available to the United States, although if these discoveries were to
be used it might have to pay for them as a "taking" of property for public
use. But persons engaged in scientific activity which had been rendered
illegal could not be compelled to report that fact in view of the privilege
against self-incrimination, unless they were granted immunity from
prosecution.
The core of the question-whether it is possible to require individual
citizens, merely because of their past education, activities, and skills to
inform the United States, or through the United States an international
body, where they are and what they are doing-is subject to argument; the
precedents are few, and perhaps distinguishable. On balance, one might

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

guess that a provision for such registration, in a treaty, or in legislation
implementing a treaty, would probably be upheld. Whether this is a desirable provision is another matter.
The constitutional issues we have considered may suggest also consequent questions of a constitutional character. For example, one may examine the possibility of an immunity statute under the fourth amendment
like that suggested under the fifth amendment; a statute which would make
it lawful to seize evidence without warrant but give the "victim" immunity
from prosecution for any crimes which the evidence reveals. But, we condude, the fourth amendment is not merely a protection against conviction
by evidence unlawfully seized; it is also an affirmative guarantee of privacy.
And one should examine the difficulties which a citizen would encounter
in asserting his constitutional rights in the courts in view of the probable
immunity to suit of the inspectors, and of a disposition of the courts not to
consider what they may deem "political questions" left to the other branches
of the government.

Conclusion
In today's world, there will be no arms control without inspection. And,
despite past failures, if nations are prepared to seek security in mutual
disarmament rather than in competitive armament, it should not be impossible to obtain agreement on "workable systems of inspection." It has been
suggested, indeed, that if an agreement to disarm is in the interest of both
the United States and the Soviet Union, it is also in the interest of both that
the agreement continue in effect, and inspection should be acceptable, even
desired, to assure that the other side will not suspect or fear violation and
terminate the agreement.
Any agreed arms inspection would apply in the United States as well.
As to any proposal or plan for arms inspection the citizen will be entitled
to ask whether it affords assurance that no other nation is violating the
agreed controls. He will be entitled to ask too what such inspection as applied in the United States would mean to him, what is its cost in impact on
his rights and traditions. And he will have to decide whether he is willing
to pay that price. But the citizen is entitled also to ask his government
whether that cost is necessary, whether some particular form of inspection
is essential elsewhere and must therefore be accepted here.
This suggests the need to concentrate care and ingenuity in examining
and developing methods of detection; to focus on what it is one needs to
know, and on alternative methods for learning what one needs to know.
Feasibility of any inspection proposal, and selection between alternatives,
must include due attention to the possible effect on the rights of citizens and
on institutions of this nation and of other nations. Where it appears that a
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proposal could not be assimilated or accepted here, surely it could not be
lightly or sincerely urged on other nations; and rejection by them need not
necessarily be evidence of a refusal to disarm or to permit effective corroboration of compliance with disarmament.
For the United States, it may be said, in sum, that the probable elements
of an arms control inspection plan lie largely within the framework of the
United States Constitution. If direct inspection by international officials is
called for, one may conclude that, even on a conservative view of the flexibility of the constitutional pattern, such inspection, for the most part, would
not do it violence. The essentials of the inspection system-the reports from
government and industry, interrogations of officials and citizens, inspection
of governmental installations, of private industrial establishments related
to armaments, perhaps even of any industrial establishments suspectedwill not turn the litmus paper of the Constitution. It is the eccentric, perhaps, the extreme suggestion-the improbable incursion into the home
without a warrant-which raises serious warning signals, and this may
prove to be only an imaginary dragon. It does not appear necessary to
effective investigation of arms control; it would raise major constitutional
questions if applied in the United States; it should not lightly materialize
in negotiations, in demands by or of other nations.
If its constitutional implications need not reach far or wide, international
inspection for arms control will nevertheless contain new elements. The
novel aspects in law, as in our traditions, will be the presence of international officials observing operations of the United States Government and
its citizens. This may be a grating, even a wrenching concept, which opponents of arms control may exploit. The "foreign" character of the inspectorate and of international control may create some problems like those
which earlier in our history resulted from federal operations in areas of the
country where "federal" meant "foreign." But the nation, and the States,
survived these tests. In peripheral respects, the United States, with other
nations, may have to accept minor international intrusion for the sake of
peace and its own security. Yet the degree of intrusion may prove rather
less than we may be asked to imagine. In its impact on the citizen, arms
control and inspection should not prove more intrusive, more jarring to
traditional behavior and liberties, than control of narcotics, or liquor, or
firearms, or filled milk. Few Americans would, in all probability, hear of
international arms inspectors; fewer still would have contact with them.
And few of these might ever be subjected to adversary, antagonistic requirements, to hostile interrogation, to subpoenas, or to unwelcome nonroutine
inspection. The citizen is already accustomed to federal, state, county and
city officials; another small, special group, under federal auspices, should
not disturb him. The contacts with international inspectors may be fewer
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than those with the inspectors to which he is accustomed; they need not be
more startling or onerous.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of thorough arms inspection in support
of thorough arms control would be the projected effect on secrecy and security. There is an air of unreality, redolent of Utopia, in a discussion which
assumes freedom of access, even to foreigners, to United States installations
and offices, which may even entail the virtual abolition of security classifications and with them security checks, and investigations, and prosecutions for espionage or related crime. And, indeed, if arms control comes, it
may still take years to replace habits of secrecy and withholding with easy
and free habits of openness and cooperation. It will take legislation to educate the public and education to make legislation possible. It will take bold
leadership, enjoying popular confidence, to bring it about and make it work.
But, again, it is useful to stress that secrecy is not a constitutional principle;
to recall times not beyond the memory of living men when "security" was
not a living concept, when there was not a single prosecution for espionage
in any form in many years, when classifications were few and relaxed. To
remind of this is not to dream idly of better, old days before total war, warm
or cold, but rather to recall that openness and freedom have at least as good
a claim in the American tradition as secrecy and fear.

